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Hannibal and the Italian Cities

during the Second Samnite War. However,

By Michael P. Fronda
Department of Classical Studies
2002 Association of Ancient Historians Annual
Meeting

both cities remained loyal to Rome during
the Second Punic War, despite repeated
overtures by Hannibal. Meanwhile Capua,
with a history of loyalty to Rome dating to

Rome's victory in the Second Punic

the Samnite Wars, and enjoying the

War paved the way for her conquest of the

privileged status of civitas sine

Mediterranean. Yet that victory is bound up

rebelled to Hannibal during the Second

with Hannibal's failure in Italy, even though

Punic War. Capua was a regional hegemonic

he brought Rome to her knees in the early

power (M. Frederiksen, Campania), and the

stages of the war. Previous explanations for

argument that convinced the Capuan senate

the failure of Hannibal's strategy have

to rebel was that an alliance with Hannibal

tended to stress either the hopelessness of

would yield an extension of Capuan territory

this strategy, because of the loyalty of Rome's

and power (Liv. 23.6.1, 10.2). After rebelling,

Italian allies and their willingness to be

Capua attempted - without Hannibal's

integrated into the Roman system, or the

assistance - to capture Cumae (Liv, 23.35.1-

success of Rome's counter-strategy of

19), and the people of Nola requested a

attrition, aimed at limiting allied revolts

Roman garrison specifically for fear of an

while wearing down Hannibal's forces (see J.

attack by the Capuans (Liv. 23.19.4). These

Lazenby in T.J. Cornell, et al., The Second

events suggest that the decision of a city to

Punic War: A Reappraisal;

debate

remain loyal to Rome or to revolt was rooted,

fundamentally framed by G. De Sanctis,

at least partly, in local diplomatic concerns.

Storia dei Romani 3.2). Previous scholarship,

In effect, by gaining Capua as an ally,

however, neglects an important dimension of

Hannibal may have strengthened the loyalty

the question of the failure of Hannibal's

of other Campanian cities fearing Capuan

strategy; that is, the significance of local

aggression. Second, Capua and Nola-Naples

conditions, especially local diplomacy and

consistently opposed each other in different

inter-municipal rivalries in shaping the

conflicts from 4 th through 3 rd centuries,

course of the war. Ultimately, Hannibal's

regardless of their relationship with Rome

strategy was incapable of dealing with the

during those conflicts. This suggests that

complex matrix of local diplomatic ties and

some inter-municipal rivalries were long

rivalries.

lasting, and persisted well after initial Roman

the

The following example will prove

suffragio,

conquest.

suggestive. Naples and Nola, two cities with

The evidence for inter-municipal

close diplomatic ties, had a history of

rivalry is the most clear for Campanian cities;

hostility toward Rome, fighting against her

however, similar patterns of local rivalry are

Ephemeris
visible selsewhere in Italy, especially in
Apulia and Magna Graecia. By shifting the
focus of the war from Rome or Hannibal to
local conditions, the Second Punic War, with
its significant corpus of ancient evidence, can
be used as a window for exploring local
municipal concerns generally overshadowed
in the sources.
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